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REPLY BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

I.
POINT I OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF DOES NOT ADDRESS
THE DISPOSITIVE ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL (THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE UNIVERSITY'S CONTRACT WITH
APPELLANT TO SUPPLY BROKERAGE SERVICES); THE
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM MUST BE REVERSED.
The various arguments set forth in Respondent's Brief under
Point I, occupying 36 pages, simply missed the target and are
not relevant to the dispositive issue on this appeal.

In that

section of its Brief, Respondent seeks to persuade this Court
that the security purchase and sale transactions engaged in by

the University are ultra vires, and hence voidable.

As amici

curiae point out under Point I of their opening brief at pages
5 through 11, a finding that such transactions were ultra vires
to the University would not be a defense to Appellant's claims
here.

Even assuming, contrary to the law, that such trans-

actions were ultra vires, any rights or remedies arising or flowing therefrom would repose in the parties to the transactions.
The record affirmatively shows that First Equity acted only as
an agent of the University, carefully and faithfully carrying out
specific instructions given by its principal - the University.
(R. 140-49, 247)*
Respondent addresses the real issue here —

the validity

and enforceability of the agency contract between the University
and Appellant —

only tangentially in the extension of the argu-

ment contained in what is labeled Appendix A attached to the Brief.
There, Respondent argues that the University has power "only" by
"contract" to supervise the erection of college buildings, to
adopt plans, drawings and specifications for those buildings,
and to make all purchases and contracts for the buildings."(See
Appendix A(2) to Respondent's Brief).
We submit that this argument is specious, for if valid,
the University could not contractually bind itself to employ a
President and other administrative officers to plan, direct and
control what transpired in those "buildings" or to purchase the

Respondent does not challenge this fact, but curiously adds
that with respect to other transactions not the subject of
this litigation First Equity did not act as the University's
agent. (Respondent's Brief at p. 8). .
-2-

myriad of supplies and services necessary to operate a University.

If Appellant's argument were held to be valid, it would

place in jeopardy the salary of every employee and the fee of
every consultant and supplier of services employed or retained
by the University.

If any one of them, at the specific direc-

tion and under order of the University, were to execute an act
ultra vires to the University, and all within the scope of his
employment, he could not collect his salary or fee.
Such is not and should not be the law.

As between the

principal and its agent, such a risk is borne by the principal
(see opening brief of amici curiae, Point I).

Respondent seeks

to circumvent this universally accepted rule of agency law by
grasping in desperation at those cases holding that, as between
an agent and the adverse party to the transaction, the agent is
liable for his own action.
trine.

We do not quarrel with that doc-

Indeed, it will make the other agents of the University

(Mr. Catron, the Institutional Council and the Board of Trustees)
who authorized or ratified the service contract between the
University and Appellant liable to Appellant if the University
escapes liability on an ultra vires theory.

However, the doc-

trine of these cases does not apply because the Respondent has
not asserted that the Appellant, its agent, has breached its
duty to the Respondent or to any third party.

Nor is there

anything in the record which even suggests that Appellant
breached that duty.

Appellant has fulfilled its duty to the

University by carefully following the University's instructions and is entitled to compensation for its services. Assum-
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ing arguendo,that those underlying transactions were ultra
vires, the University is, nonetheless, liable to its own agent,
the Appellant, for the fees which it agreed to pay for the
services which were rendered to the University by the Appellant.
II.
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, RESPONDENT IS
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO
THE AGREEMENTS HERE INVOLVED WITH FIRST EQUITY
CORPORATION FOR THE SUPPLYING OF BROKERAGE
SERVICES.
In POINT II of the brief of amici curiae, an argument
is set forth that the University is estopped from asserting
that the contracts complained of were ultra vires.

Respondent's

reply commencing at page 43 of its opening brief asserts that
the cases and authorities cited and relied upon by amici curiae
are inapposite.

This conclusion is bottomed entirely upon the

continuing assumption of Respondent that the underlying securities purchase transactions were "ultra vires."

From this assump-

tion is bootstrapped another, namely, that since the purchase
transactions were ultra vires, the agreement of the University
to pay for brokerage services is also ultra vires. As we argue
at Point I of this brief, supra, the second assumption does
not follow the first, even assuming, arguendo, the validity of
the first.

When the second assumption falls, as it must, the

entire underpinning for this portion of Respondent's brief collapses and it becomes clear that the doctrine of estoppel applies
under the facts and circumstances of this case.
However, assuming, arguendo, the validity of the assumption that both the underlying purchase transaction and the agree-

- -
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ment between the University and First Equity Corporation for
the providing of brokerage services were found to be "ultra
vires," Respondent's argument, nonetheless, is not valid.
The benchmark case of this Court on this subject is Wall vs.
Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P.766 (1917).

That case has

not been reversed nor has the doctrine there announced been
changed by this Court in subsequent cases.

That case was a

much weaker case for the application of an estoppel doctrine
against*a governmental body than is the case at bar because,
there, the City was acting purely in its "governmental" capacity.
By contrast, here, the University was acting in its proprietary
capacity, dealing as an investor and entering into a contract
for the provision of designated services.

This Court in Wall

at page 6 04 recognized this vital difference in governmental
action, and the legal consequences thereof, by citing and quoting with approval 3 Dillon, Mun. Corps. (5th Ed.) Sec. 1194
which in pertinent part states:
Municipal corporations, as we have seen, are
regarded as having, in some respects, a double
character, one public, the other (by way of
distinction) private. As respects property
not held for public use, or upon public trust,
and as respects contracts and rights of a private nature, there is no reason why such corporations should not fall within limitation
statutes, and be affected by them unless
excluded from them. . . .
Despite this distinction and the fact that in Wall
plaintiff sought to cut off the rights of the City to a public
street, the Court imposed upon the City the doctrine of estoppel
in pais.

In so doing, it recognized that this was the doctrine

to be applied only in special circumstances, stating at page 601:

(Referring to cases holding that estoppel does
not apply such as those cited by Respondent):
None of them present a case like this, where the
municipality, by its own affirmative acts, declarations, and conduct, misled the party, or induced
him to believe that he had the right to rely upon
the assurances which the municipality, after a long
period of time, sought to repudiate to his injury.
Indeed, it is hardly to be expected that many cases,
if any at all, can be found in the published report
similar to the case at bar. It will be found upon
examination that many of the cases above cited
placed emphasis upon the fact that the municipality
did not do anything affirmatively to mislead the
party claiming the right to the ground in dispute.
[Emphasis added]
It is difficult to imagine language that more nicely fits
the facts and circumstances of this case, and, in addition, we
are here talking about a simple contract for brokerage services
which clearly falls within the ambit of proprietary, not governmental, action.

The court in Wall then stated at page 607:

We believe, as was said by the Court in City of
Sullivan v. Tichnor, supra, cited by appellant,
that:
"A municipal corporation can no more profit
by fraud upon property owners than an individual and may be estopped by conduct."
Or, as said by Judge Dillon, in note one to the section above quoted, referring to the character of
acts necessary to constitute an estoppel:
"The principle of estoppel in pais has
been applied to exceptional cases where
the elements calling for its exercise appear
to have been an abandonment of the public
use for the prescriptive period, inclosure
and expensive improvements, such as large
and costly buildings, or acts of the municipality inducing the abutter to believe that
there is no longer any street, and the expenditure of money in reliance upon the acts of
the municipality. The absolute bona fides
of the abutter or adverse possessor is a most
important factor where an estoppel in pais is
claimed. The acts relied on must be of such
character as to amount to a fraud, if the
city were permitted to claim otherwise."

We hold that this case falls within the exceptional class of cases referred to by Judge
Dillon, and that it is the duty of the Court
to decide it as "right and justice require."
It is our opinion that the City is estopped
from claiming the premises in question as a
public street. [Emphasis by the Court]
We respectfully assert that this doctrine is here applicable.

It is difficult to conceive of clearer action on the

part of the University to induce action on the part of its
agent pursuant to the agency contract.

The same was accom-

plished by the ritual of a formal resolution. (R. 137-38$ 151).
First Equity Corporation acted in good faith, advancing its
own funds, and performing requested services in precisely the
manner designated by the University.

"Right and justice require"

the imposition of the doctrine of estoppel.

Indeed, as was true

in Wall, to permit the University to escape responsibility for
its contract under the facts on this record would permit it to
"profit by fraud."

It should not be permitted so to do.

In Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406
(1941), this Court discussed Wall at length.

This Court cited

with approval, relied upon and followed the reasoning in Wall
to the facts then before it, though after "balancing the
justices of the cause," the Court refrained from applying the
doctrine in the Tooele City case stating at page 494:
In the case at bar, the consideration given the
city by Elkington was small, if anything; the
deed was made in contravention of the statute;
there is no evidence that the property has been
assessed against the defendants or their predecessor in interest; the time element is short;
and there was not a replatting or a change in
the whole neighborhood to the benefit of all
adjacent landowners.

In its opening brief, Respondent relies primarily upon
a Federal decision, Provo City v. Denver & Rio Grande Western.R. Co, ,
156 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1946), as"modifying the doctrine enunciated in Wall and Tooele City.

Respondent's position is not

valid because:
a)

In Provo City, the court specifically found

(156 F.2d at 712) that the defendant Railroad had full knowledge
of the underlying facts and hence was not in a position to invoke
the doctrine of estoppel in pais in any event.
b)

In Provo City, the City was clearly acting in

its governmental capacity, as contrasted with the University's
proprietary contract which Appellant here seeks to enforce.
c)

The Court of Appeals in Provo City restricted

the application of its opinion to estoppel applied against "a
fcity in respect of its right to reopen a street for use of a
public thoroughfare" and recognized that the doctrine would apply
in "peculiar circumstances" such as those presented in Wall.
Furthermore, a vigorous dissenting opinion was written by Judge
Phillips which asserted that the majority opinion misconstrued
and misapplied both Wall and Elkington.
d)
courts.

Finally, Provo City was a case in the Federal

As the court specifically found in Provo City, the

Federal Court is without constitutional power under the teachings of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817,
82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 ALR 1487 (1938),to change existing Utah law
in any way.

Its only function was to construe and apply the sub-

stantive law of the State of Utah as enunciated by this Court.

We respectfully submit from the foregoing that the
cases and authorities set forth in the opening brief of amici
curiae are here controlling and that the doctrine of estoppel
in pais should be imposed against the University.

This is

particularly true with respect to such unappropriated funds
as "grants, gifts, devises, bequests," "dedicated credits"
and "tuitions, fees and Federal grants" with respect to which
the Legislature in the most clear and unambiguous fashion has
delegated to the University the authority to "convert" and
"invest". (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 53-32-4 (1970),discussed infra).
How could the University receive a gift of common stock and
proceed to convert and reinvest proceeds from such conversion
without employing the services of a broker?

The University

obviously had the power to employ a broker and should be estopped
from denying the same under the peculiar facts and circumstances
demonstrated by this record.

The judgment appealed from should

be reversed.
III.
THE UNDERLYING SECURITIES PURCHASE AND SALES
TRANSACTIONS WERE NOT ULTRA VIRES; THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM MUST BE REVERSED.
The bulk of Respondent's brief is devoted to argument
that the securities transactions in which Appellant acted as
Respondent's agent broker were ultra vires.

The argument is

grounded upon two erroneous assumptions:
a)

That neither the Utah Constitution nor enactments

of the Territorial or State Legislatures delegate to the University power to purchase and sell common stocks, and;

*f

b)

That Utah Code Annotated, Sections 33-1-1 and

33-1-3 constitute "enabling" legislation, are the only repository of University authority to purchase securities and constitute an absolute prohibition against purchasing any security
not on the statutory list contained in Section 33-1-1,
It does not appear to us that either of these assumptions
is valid.
1.

At all times here pertinent, the University was em-

powered to invest both appropriated and non-appropriated funds
in common stocks.
A.

Appropriated Funds.

Pertinent portions of the

Territorial enactments, the Constitutional provisions and subsequently enacted statutes by the State Legislature are quoted
and discussed in the Brief of amici curiae under POINT IV at
pages 15-22 of their opening brief.
here.

We will not restate them

However, by way of summary, we invite the attention of

the Court to the following general grants of authority historically given to the University which apply to appropriated funds
as well as most other property that falls into the hands of the
University.
(i). Comp. Laws of Utah 1888, Section 1855.

The

University was established by the Territorial Legislature as a
common law trust.

The Trustees were given "general control and

supervision" over "all appropriations", subject only to the proviso that their action shall be "not inconsistent with the laws
of the Territory."

-in-

(2)

Utah Constitution, Art. 10, Sec. 4.

The Con-

stitution specifically provides that all of the rights conferred upon the University by the Territorial Legislature
"are hereby perpetuated."
(3)

1929 Session Laws, Ch. 41, Sec. 2; Utah Code

Ann. Sec. 53-32-2 (1953),

In 1929, the Utah Legislature

reiterated the perpetuation of all such rights theretofore
"granted or conferred" and further provided that the University :"may sue and be sued and contract and be contracted with"
and "may take, hold, lease, sell and convey real and personal
property as the interests of the dollege may require."
(4)

1929 Session Laws, Ch. 41, Sec. 3; Utah Code

Ann. Sec. 53-32-3 (1953).

The same

Legislature, in the follow-

ing Section provided specifically that the University may
"bring and maintain actions to recover, protect and preserve
property and rights of the university and to enforce any contract relating thereto."
(5)

1929 Session Laws, Ch. 41, Sec. 4; Utah Code

Ann. Sec. 53-32-4 (1953).

In the next section, the same Legi-

slature authorized the University to "take by purchase, grant,
gift, devise or bequest any real or personal property for the
use of any department of the college and for any purpose appropriate to the object of the University."

It also provided that

the University "may convert property" and that property received
by the University may be "held, invested and managed and the
proceeds thereof used by the board of trustees for the purposes
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and under the conditions prescribed in the grant or donation."
(6)

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 53-48-10(5) (1953).

In

1969, the Legislature also reiterated the general power of
the University to "handle its own financial affairs under the
general supervision of the board."
We respectfully submit that these various statutory provisions conferred upon the University very broad discretionary
investment powers which included the authority to invest in
common stocks.

Throughout Respondent's Brief, it is asserted

that the Legislature could not have so intended for it would
permit the University to engage in gross speculative endeavors.
This is not true.

It will be recalled that the University was

established by the Territorial Legislature as a common law trust
and all of the.common law and statutory restrictions upon actions
of such fiduciaries tethered the investment policy of the University.

Furthermore, the Territorial Legislature specifically

reserved the right to enact subsequent laws to correct or control any abuses by requiring that all control and supervision
over appropriations must not be "inconsistent with the laws of
the Territory."

These provisions were perpetuated and expanded

upon by the Constitution and subsequent statutes.

The Legisla-

ture, in its wisdom, did not see fit to impose specific restrictions upon the investment policy of the University until enactment of the State Money Management Act on February 2, 1974 (Utah
Code Ann. Sections 51-7-1, et. seq.

f
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Supp. 1975).

Respondent relies heavily upon University of Utah v.
Board of Examiners of State of Utah, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d
348 (1956).

Its reliance upon that case is not here apropos.

As Respondent asserts in its brief, "the University of Utah"
there was contending that "it was completely free from the
control of the Legislature, administrative bodies, commissions,
agencies and officers of the State."
contention in this case.

Amici curiae make no such

They assert that the Legislature may

control the kinds and types of investments made by the University.

However, the Legislature refrained from so acting until

enactment of the State Money Management Act in 197 4 (Utah Code
Ann. §§ 51-7-1 et. seq. (1953)).
The opinion of Judge Aldon J. Anderson in State of Utah
v. duPont Walston, Inc. (f74-f75 Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1(94812 (D. Utah, Oct. 1, 1974) reflects that virtually identical arguments were asserted by Respondent in an action in the
United States District Court against duPont Walston, Inc. as
are set forth in its brief before this Court.

After reviewing

Respondent's arguments and the Territorial, Constitutional and
legislative enactments discussed above, Judge Anderson commented in that case at page 96,716:
The Court has serious concerns with plaintiffs1
[The State of Utah and Utah State University]
theory [that the University does not have power
to invest in common stocks]for it does not
appear that the Utah Code Ann. Sec. 33-1-1 (1966)
is an enabling statute which clearly sets forth
the investment guidelines for State universities.
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B.

Unappropriated Funds,

In POINT I, Subpoint B,

Respondent asserts that "Judge Christofferson did not find a
triable issue of fact in granting USUfs cross motion." (Respondent's Brief, p. 35). This assertion by Respondent and the argument in aid thereof simply does not square with the record in
this proceeding.

As amici curiae point out in POINT III of

their Brief, at pages 14-15, the Court below did indeed recognize such "triable issue of fact."
Judge Christofferson first made a legal assumption that
"there was authority for the university to invest those [grant
or contract] funds." (R. 258). He then stated that "there is
at least a triable issue of fact whether USU . . . had funds
which it had received from individual grants or development contracts sufficient to pay for all or part of said stock." (R. 435B)
In argument Respondent seeks to bifurcate the action of the
Court below and ignore a portion of the record before this Court.
(Respondent's Brief at pp. 35, et. seq.)

The Court below was not

at liberty so to act for Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure requires the Court to consider all matters of record
in disposing of a motion for summary judgment.

The existence of

this triable issue of fact alone clearly requires reversal of the
judgment appealed from.
We also invite the attention of the Court to the fact that
the "assumption" of the Court below that "there was authority for
the University to invest those funds" was a correct assumption.
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 53-3-4 (1953) enacted in 1929 and still in
force specifically authorizes the University in its "corporate
capacity" to take by purchase, grant, gift, devise or bequest any

property, real or personal, to "convert" the same "into other
property" and to invest and manage the same.

The Indiana

Supreme Court in Sendak v. Trustees of Indiana University,
254 Ind. 390, 260 N.E. 2d 601 (1970) resolved an identical
issue, holding that the Board of Trustees, under a near identical statute, was empowered to invest such funds in common stocks.
The Sendak court held:
1)

That the State of Indiana was not the owner of

gifts from private donors to the University of Indiana Board
of Trustees;
2)

That the Board of Trustees of Indiana University

acts in a dual capacity as Directors of the University operations and as common law Trustees of private trusts created for
the benefit of the University by private donors; and
3)

That the Board of Trustees was authorized to

make and hold investments in common stock of private corporations out of money received from private sources.

In reaching

this conclusion, the Indiana Court stated:
The property with which we are concerned was not
given to the State of Indiana. Thus, the State
of Indiana is not the owner of the gifts from the
private donors to the trustees. They were given
in trust upon certain limitations and specifica. tions. To say that they became the property of
the State of Indiana would be a violation of the
trust imposed upon the trustees pursuant to the
statute under which they are authorized to accept
such funds. The trustees have a duty and obligation, as trustees have in a private trust, to
use good judgment and prudence in the management
of the funds entrusted to them and to keep them
properly and prudently invested, with due regard
to enhancing the income, as far as the same may
be reasonably and safely done. The mere fact

-15-

that the trustees happen to act in another
capacity and are a corporate body affected with
a public interest does not prohibit them from
also acting as trustees of private funds, particularly in this case, where the statute specifically authorizes such activity. It is true
that the property here involved has certain public
or charitable purposes, but that does not make
the State of Indiana the owner of such funds any
more than the State of Indiana is the owner of
funds placed in trust with some other private
trustee for the same purposes, namely, educational
purposes at Indiana University. [260 N.E. 2d at
603]
The principles applied by the Indiana Supreme Court in the
Sendak case should be applied in this case by this Court.
Section 53-48-10(4) (1953) authorizes the University to
manage and control funds classified as "dedicated credits such
as tuitions, fees" and "Federal grants" for use in institutional
work programs.

Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 53-48-20 (1953) like-

wise authorizes the University to accept "contributions, grants
or gifts from any private organization, company, firm, industry
or individual, or any governmental agency" and to "retain, accumulate, invest, commit and expend" funds so received.
It follows from the foregoing that the University at the
time here pertinent had authority delegated by the State Legislature, which authority in earlier years had been delegated by the
Territorial Legislature, to invest its appropriated funds in
common stocks.
Further, it appears to us to be clear beyond reasonable

As we have previously noted in Points I and II, supra, the existence of this authority is not relevant to disposing of the
issues now before this Court. We comment and argue herein
only in response to the lengthy argument set forth in Respondent's Brief.
i £

dispute that the University was empowered to, invest nonappropriated funds .in common stocks.

The Court below so

recognized and reserved this issue of fact.

It was the

burden of the moving party, the University, to establish on
the record this missing link to sustain a motion for summary
judgment.

The judgment granting the University's motion for

summary judgment must be reversed.
2.

Sections 31-1-1 and 31-1-2, Utah Code Annotated,

constitute neither investment "enabling" statutes nor a
statutory prohibition against investment in properties not
specifically stated on the approved statutory list.
The complete text of Section 31-1-1 (1953), Utah Code
Annotated, is set forth in the Appendix to the opening brief
of amici curiae.

It applies with equal force and effect to

"any private, political, or public instrumentality, body, corporation or person."

It neither explicitly nor by implication

constitutes an initial grant of power to such public or private
corporations or persons to invest in specific properties; nor
does it explicitly or by implication constitute an exclusive
list of properties in which public and private corporations
and persons may invest.

Section 33-1-3, Utah Code Annotated,

specifically provides:
The provisions of this Act are supplemental to
any and all other laws relating to and declaring what shall be legal investments for the
persons, corporations . . . referred to in this
Act. . . . [Emphasis added]
And, as is pointed out at pages 21-3 of the opening brief of
amici curiae, the State Money Management Act enacted on February

2, 1974 (Utah Code Ann. §51-7-1, et. seq. (1953)) for the
first time imposes specific legislative restraints on investment in common stock by the University.

All inconsistent

sections of the Utah statutes were specifically repealed by
that Act.

Respondent in its brief so admits and affirmatively

asserts at page 34:
Indeed the Act specifically amends any pre-existing
sections of the Code dealing with the deposit and
investment of public funds (e.g. Sec. 65-1-65).
The Legislature expressly stated that the purpose of that
Act was "to establish and maintain" a continuing state-wide
policy for the deposit and investment of public funds. (Utah
Code Ann. §51-7-2(b) (Supp. 1975)). Since Section 31-1-1 is
neither "enabling" nor "prohibitory", the Legislature had no
reason to and did not amend that section when it established such
policy by enacting the Money Management Act.
It follows that neither of the basic premises underpinning
Respondent's "no power" argument is sound.

Not until the enact-

ment of the State Money Management Act were the restrictions
which Respondent claims flow
law by the Legislature.

from Section 31-1-1 enacted into

At the time of the investments here at

issue, the State was empowered by statute to invest in common
stocks.
power.

Section 31-1-1 did not and does not now impair that
The judgment appealed from should be reversed.
IV.
RESPONDENT'S ASSERTED DEFENSE OF "REVOCATION
OF AUTHORITY" IS WITHOUT FOUNDATION IN FACT OR
IN LAW; THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM MUST BE
REVERSED.
In argument commencing at page 57 of Respondent's Brief,

the University asserts that the action of the Court below should

be affirmed because "USU had withdrawn from Catron any authority it had previously conferred upon him of which fact First
Equity had notice."

Respondent reaches this conclusion by

a curious and erroneous pyramiding of inferences.

The first

inference is that "either First Security Bank or Walker Bank,
or both of them" were put on inquiry as to Catron's authority
by virtue of reading newspaper reports that the "Attorney
General's office believed it was illegal for USU to purchase
stock."

Respondent does not advise the Court as to how notice

of such Attorney General's belief on the legality of University action related in any way to revocation of specific
authorizations from USU to Mr. Catron.

Second, the Court is

asked to infer that from such notice, First Security Bank and
Walker Bank were saddled with a duty to investigate to determine whether or not Catron's authority had been revoked. Third,
the Court is asked to infer that such inquiry would have
resulted in a declaration by the University that Catron had no
authority.

Next, the Court is asked to infer that both of the

banks involved had been retained by Appellant and were acting
as its agents, not the agents of the University.

Finally, the

Court is asked to infer that such knowledge,synthesized through
this chain of inferences,somehow was imputable to Appellant.
We assert that this entire argument is wholly without merit.
None of the authorities cited would justify the result claimed.
The uncontroverted facts are:
1.

The Institutional Council by formal resolution speci-

fically authorized Mr. Catron to represent and bind the Univer-

sity in the purchase and sale of securities.

The formal

resolution further provided that he and other designated
officers of the University may bind the University by giving
"written or verbal instruction to the brokers concerning the
herein named transactions" and finally " [t]hat this resolution
shall be and remain in full force and effect until written
notice of the revocation hereof shall be delivered to the
brokers." (R. 106, 137-8).
2.

The record contains no evidence that written notice

of revocation was ever given to Appellant.
3.

The record contains no evidence that oral revoca-

tion was given to Appellant.
4.

The record contains no evidence that any representa-

tive of Appellant was advised of the newspaper articles relied
upon by Respondent or that Appellant received any information
whatsoever that would put it on notice of any revocation of
authority conferred by the formal resolution of the Institutional
Council.
5.

First Security Bank and Walker Bank were selected

and designated by Mr. Catron, not by Appellant.

All of the deal-

ings by Appellant with either of those banks was at the direction
and instruction of Catron. (R. 363, Paragraphs 28-29).
We respectfully submit that this argument forwarded by
Respondent is without merit and that the judgment appealed from
must be reversed.
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V.
THE CLAIMED VIOLATION OF "REGULATION T"
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LEGAL DEFENSE TO THE
CLAIMS ASSERTED BY APPELLANT; THE JUDGMENT
APPEALED FROM MUST BE REVERSED.
The Respondent likewise cannot prosper under the
various arguments set forth under Point II of its opening
brief.

In those arguments, Respondent claims that First

Equity violated Regulation T promulgated by the Federal
Reserve Board and that such violation constitutes a defense
to Appellant's claims.

The Court below erroneously so held.

The proper interpretation to be afforded Regulation T is
clearly a question of Federal law.

Subsequent to the filing

of Respondent's brief herein, the United States District Court
for the District of Utah entered Memorandum Opinion and order
through which claims of the University asserted against other
brokers on identical transactions were dismissed with prejudice.

As is apparent from the Memorandum Opinion and Order

which is reproduced for the convenience of this Court herein
as Appendix A, Respondent made the same arguments and cited
the same cases before the United States District Court as are
contained in its opening brief before this Court.

On Motions

for Summary Judgment and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
the Federal Court rejected the claims as a matter of law.

The

Federal Court held that following the adoption by the Federal
Reserve Board of "Regulation X" (designated to regulate the
obtaining of credit by a borrower - the University here), any
theretofore implied

right of action on the part of a borrower against an extender
of credit (the Appellant here) for the latter's violation of
Regulation T was extinguished.

The Federal Court also denied

any such right of action on the part of the University on the
additional grounds of an "in pari delicto" defense, and that
any implied right of action would not inure to an institutional
investor such as the University.

In so ruling, the Federal

Court stated in part at pages 10-12:
Both Regulations T and X were promulgated under
Section 7 of the 1934 Act and the purposes of
both regulations are aimed at realizing or stabilizing a desirable macroeconomic goal of Congress rather than the protection of investors.
While an implied right of action under Regulation
T has been granted by some courts, the promulgation of Regulation X and the facts of this case
put the issue of the interface of the two regulations directly before the court. Regarding the
status of the private right of action in light of
the interface, at least four different results can
be suggested: (1) The basis for a private damage
action for violation of Regulation T has been
undermined and canceled out by the amendment of
section 7 of the 19 34 Act and the promulgation of
Regulation X thereunder for the reason that in the
past under Regulation T the broker shouldered the
entire responsibility for compliance with the
margin requirements, but Regulation X now puts the
responsibility equally upon the investor. (2) The
private right of action survives in the face of
the promulgation of Regulation X; however, Regulation X provides an in pari delicto or equal fault
defense in an action by an investor that the court
or jury can manipulate in making a determination as
to the degree of culpability of each party. (3) The
private right of action survives in the face of promulgation of Regulation X, unless the investor has
wilfully and intentionally tried to evade the provisions of the margin requirements. (4) The private
right of action survives in the face of the promulgation of Regulation X and a broker can expose himself to almost strict liability for a violation of
Regulation T for the reason that someone should be
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saddled with the responsibility of assuring
compliance with the margin requirements and
the broker is in the best posture to do this.
The In pari delicto defense would be denied
under this approach for the reason that private suits serve an important enforcement function and this enforcement purpose would disallow an in pari delicto defense in the securities area as it has been disallowed in the antitrust area.
The court is of the opinion that, as outlined in
the first alternative, the promulgation of Regulation X has removed the necessary legal underpinning for implying a private right of action
•for a violation of the margin requirements, and
that Regulation X cancels out the private right
of action implied under Regulation T. As a
matter of law, therefore, Count V in the complaints which alleges a violation of Regulation
T should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Further,
however, the court is of the opinion that the
motions for summary judgment would have to be
granted in favor of defendants for other reasons
under the facts of these cases.*
It follows that the Court below erred in dismissing
Appellant's complaint because of non-compliance by Appellant
with the requirements of Regulation T and the judgment here
appealed from must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
and
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
The court then proceeded to state supplemental grounds for
dismissing the University's cause with prejudice, namely (1)
the University is an "institutional investor" beyond any conceivable protection of Regulation T within the intent of
Congress; and (2) after the promulgation of Regulation X,
an in pari delicto defense would defeat any claim of the
University founded upon Regulation T.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
NORTHERN DIVISION
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE,
a Utah body politic and
corporate,
Plaintiff,
v.

NC 74-38

BEAR, STEARNS & CO., a
corporation,
Defendant.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE,
a Utah body politic and
corporate,
Plaintiff,
NC 74-39

v.
BLYTH EASTMAN DILLON & CO.,
INC., a corporation,
Defendant.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE,
a Utah body politic and
corporate,
Plaintiff,

NC 74-40

v.
BOSWORTH, SULLIVAN & COMPANY,
INC., a corporation,
Defendant.

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE,
a Utah body politic and
corporate,
Plaintiff,

:
:

:

NC 74-41

v.
HARRIS, UPHAM AND CO., INC.,
Defendant.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE,
a Utah body politic and
corporate,
Plaintiff,

:
:
~

v.

NC 74-42

HORNBLOWER & WEEKS-HEMPHILL,
NOYES, INC.,

:

Defendant.

:

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE,
a Utah body politic and
corporate,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:
NC 74-43

v.
LEHMAN BROTHERS, INC.,
Defendant.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE,
a Utah body politic and
corporate,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHEARSON, HAMMILL & CO. INC.,

:
:

:
:
:
:
:

NC

74_44

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE,
a Utah body politic and
corporate,
Plaintiff,
NC 74-45

v.
SUTRO & CO. , INC. ,
Defendant.
THE STATE OF UTAH, and UTAH
STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE
AND APPLIED SCIENCE, a Utah
body politic and corporate,
Plaintiffs,

NC 74-46

v.
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER
& SMITH, INC., a corporation,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
MERRILL LYNCHfS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
AND ALL OTHER DEFENDANTS1 MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON
COUNTS I, II, III, IV AND V OF THE COMPLAINTS AND
DISMISSING THE PENDENT CLAIMS BASED ON STATE LAW THEORIES

Vernon B. Romney, Utah Attorney General and David L.
Wilkinson, Assistant Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for plaintiff in all the above-entitled matters, and Richard W.
Giauque and Brent M. Stevenson of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall
and McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiffs in MC 74-46.
Keith E. Taylor, Daniel M. Allred and Krege B. Christensen
of Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defend-

ants Bear, Stearns & Co., NC 74-38; Harris, Upham & Co. , Inc.,
NC 74-41; Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., NC 74-42;
Lehman Brothers, Inc., NC 74-43; Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc.,
NC 74-44; Sutro & Co., Inc., NC 74-45; and Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., NC 74-46.
Parker M. Nielson of Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., NC 74-39.
Harold G. Christensen and R. Brent Stephens of Worsley,
Snow & Christensen of Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant Bosworth,
Sullivan & Company, Inc., NC 74-40.
1/
On September 20, 19 74, plaintiff in the above-entitled
matters filed suits against the nine named stock brokerage firms.
As set out below, the cases arise from similar investment transactions in the same investment program carried on by Utah State
University [hereinafter the University] and in most cases the
allegations in plaintiff's complaints and the defenses thereto
2/
are identical.
Although the cases have not been consolidated,
they have been processed simultaneously and argued together, and
this order will apply to all the cases as set out above.
In these actions the plaintiff University seeks to recover
losses arising out of certain investments it made in common stock
through the various defendant brokerage firms.

For a period of

time subsequent to June, 1970, the then Assistant Vice President
of Finance of the University and the University's investment
officer, made numerous investments in securities on behalf of the
University and executed such investments through various securi-
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ties brokerage houses in Utah and elsewhere, some of which
are named as defendants in the actions herein.

Many of the

aforesaid investments were in common stocks, the market price
of some of which declined markedly subsequent to the University^ investments, allegedly resulting in substantial loss
to the University.
On November 15, 1974, all the defendants filed a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 8(e)(1), and

A/

9(b)

except defendant Merrill Lynch who, on that day, filed

a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c).

These.motions were accompanied by memoranda

in support thereof and the parties have filed extensive memoranda since that time; to wit, plaintiff filed a memorandum in
opposition to the aforementioned motions on December 11, 19 74;
defendants filed a reply memorandum in support of their motions
on December 17, 1974; plaintiff filed a supplemental memorandum
in opposition on December 19, 19 74; and on February 4 and 11,
19 75, the parties filed post-hearing memoranda in support of
their respective positions.

Oral argument was requested by all

of the parties and was heard, with counsel for all of the
parties present and participating, on January 29 and 30, 1975,
at which time the matter was taken under advisement.

On May

5, 1975, the court filed an order allowing the parties to file
affidavits or other supporting materials in support of certain
factual allegations made in their motions and memoranda in
order

that the pending motions to dismiss could alternatively

be treated by the court as motions for summary judgment pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
COUNTS I, II AND III OF THE COMPLAINTS.
Counts I and II of each complaint allege violations of
section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3, and of the National Association of Security Dealers

£/
(hereinafter NASD) Rules of Fair Practice, Article III, § 1 and
5/
§ 2 promulgated by NASD thereunder. Count III is similar in
nature and*is based upon an alleged violation of section 6 of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f and upon Rule 405 ("Know-YourCustomer Rule) of the New York Stock Exchange and Rule 411 of the
American Stock Exchange (which is similar to said Rule 405), promulgated by the respective stock exchange thereunder.
In State of Utah v. duPont Walston, Inc., et al., CCH SEC.
L. REP. 11 94,812, at 96,713 (D.C. Utah, October 1, 1974) (hereinafter cited as duPont), this court decided that a private right
of action does not exist for the aggrieved customer to sue a
broker-dealer in federal court for violation of a rule of one of
the self-regulatory bodies to which the broker-dealer belongs.
Counts I, II and III of all of the complaints, except the Merrill
Lynch complaint, NC 74-46, are virtually identical, both in form
and in substance, to the complaint in duPont.

Therefore, based

£/
upon the court's ruling in duPont, defendants1

motions to dis-

miss are hereby granted as to Counts I, II and III for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Counts I, II and III in the Merrill Lynch complaint are
different from their counterparts in the other complaints in that
-6-

an allegation is made that the facts alleged in the first three
counts also violate Rule 10b-5.

It appears that plaintiffs in

the Merrill Lynch complaint seek to buttress a Rule 10b-5
claim with reference to the NASD and Stock Exchange Rules as
these rules might bear upon the duty owed to the plaintiffs by
defendants.

Since the court has already ruled that alleged

violations of these rules do not give rise to a private right
of action, it is difficult to conceive what different result
or advantage plaintiffs might seek, evidentiary or otherwise,
by combining the alleged violations of the rules with a 10b-5
claim.

If the violation of the aforementioned rules cannot

sustain a private right of action standing alone, it adds
nothing to combine these allegations with alleged Rule 10b-5
violations, especially when Count IV of the complaint alleges
a separate Rule 10b-5 claim.

Thus, for the reasons set forth

above in regard to the unavailability of a private right of
action under the aforementioned rules and with the reasons set
forth below regarding the Rule 10b-5 count of the complaint,
Counts I, II and III of the Merrill Lynch complaints, NC 74-46,
are dismissed as being cumulative and redundant.
COUNT IV ALLEGED RULE 10b-5 VIOLATIONS
Count IV of each complaint alleges a violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5.

Count IV, in essence, alleges that defendant

omitted to state certain material facts which were necessary

in order to make the statements that the defendants did make,
in connection with the purchase of securities by the plaintiff,
not misleading.

The alleged material omissions are the same

allegations which are found in the first three counts of the
complaints —

the suitability claims against defendant under

the NASD and Stock Exchange Rules.
Omissions concerning the suitability of a stock are not
the kind of omissions which give rise to Rule 10b-5 or any antifraud liability.

Professor Bromberg states:

The embryonic requirement that a broker dealer's
recommendation be "suitable" for his customers,
primarily in terms of risk and their needs and
situations, is a product of industry self-regulation.

2/
Except for "boiler-shop" cases, it presently lies
outside 10b-5 and other fraud rules. 1 BROMBERG,
SECURITY LAWS: FRAUD, § 5.4, at 99-100 (1974),
accord, VI L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 3720
(Supp. 1969).
The court has not been cited a case, nor has the court
found a case, which has held on the merits that a broker-dealer's
omissions concerning suitability of a stock is a basis for Rule
10b-5 liability.

Disregarding the suitability allegations in

Count IV, which do not give rise to Rule 10b-5 liability, the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Therefore, Counts IV of plaintiffs1 complaints are dismissed,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for the reasons set forth
r

herein.
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REGULATIONS T AND X
Except for the complaints against Lehman Brothers,
Inc. and Sutro & Co., Inc., the University alleges in Count
V of the complaints a violation of Regulation T of the
Federal Reserve Board by defendants.

The University further

alleges that it maintained a special cash account with each
of the defendants, and although it did not make payment within 35 days from the trade date of certain enumerated purchase
transactions, the defendants did not cancel the purchases or
otherwise liquidate the University's accounts, nor did the
defendants apply for an extension of time as required by Regulation T.
Regulation T, promulgated pursuant to section 7(c) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c), determines the initial minimum margin requirements that brokers and
dealers may extend to their customers.

Basically, a margin

requirement is the amount of down payment required on any given
security purchased on credit.

When, as in these cases, a

special cash account is used, the purchases or sales are essen-

£/
tially cash, nor credit transactions.
If the cash, in the
case of a purchase, is not deposited in the account within the

1/

required time,

the broker-dealer must, subject to certain

limitations, liquidate the account.

Thus, a Regulation T vio-

lation occurs most generally when the broker-dealer fails to
make a timely liquidation.
The main purpose behind section 7 of the 1934 Act, under
which Regulation T was promulgated, was set forth in the report

of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:
The main purpose of these margin provisions . . .
is not to increase the safety of security loans
for lenders. Banks and brokers normally require
sufficient collateral to make themselves safe without the help of law. Nor is the main purpose even
protection of the small speculator by making it
impossible for him to spread himself too thinly —
although such a result will be achieved as a byproduct of the main purpose.
The main purpose is to give a Government credit
agency an effective method of reducing the aggregate amount of the nationfs credit resources which
can be directed by speculation into the stock
market and out of other more desirable uses of
commerce and industry—to prevent a recurrence of
the pre-crash situation where funds which would
otherwise have been available at normal interest
rates for uses of local commerce, industry and
agriculture, were drained by far higher rates
into security loans and the New York call market.
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
As seen from the foregoing, only secondarily was the interest of
lenders-brokers and investors considered.
While no civil remedy for margin violations exists under
the 1934 Act, and even without the primary purpose of section 7
being the protection of the investor, courts have nevertheless
been willing to imply a private right of action for investors
from a mere Federal Reserve Board regulation based on one of
10/
three theories: tort, enforcement, or contract.
Until recently
the margin requirements, through Regulation T, were addressed exclusively to those who extended credit in securities transactions and,
consequently, in any transaction in which credit for the purchase
of securities was involved, the lender had the burden of observing margin requirements.
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In 1971, Congress amended section 7 of the 1934 Act
to prohibit the receipt of loans by investors in violation
11/
of the margin requirements.

This legislation was imple-

mented through another Federal Reserve Board regulation, Regulation X.

Regulation X makes unlawful an investor's obtain-

ing of any credit in violation of the margin requirements;
however, there is no violation if the borrower makes a good
faith mistake and, upon discovery of the mistake, promptly
12/
takes whatever steps necessary to remedy the non-compliance.
In passing Title III of the Bank Records and Foreign
Transactions Act, under which Regulation X was promulgated,
Congress was concerned with deterring tax evasion and other
13/
criminal activities.
Regulation X has as its stated purpose:
[T]o prevent the infusion of unregulated
credit obtained both outside and within the
United States securities markets in circumvention of the provisions of the Boardfs margin
regulations or by borrowers falsely certifying
the purpose of a loan or otherwise wilfully and
intentionally evading the provisions of those
regulations.14/
Both Regulations T and X were promulgated under section 7 of the
1934 Act and the purposes of both regulations are aimed at realizing or stabilizing a desirable macroeconomic goal of Congress
rather than the protection of investors.
While an implied right of action under Regulation T has
been granted by some courts, the promulgation of Regulation X
and the facts of this case put the issue of the interface of the
two regulations directly before the court.

Regarding the status

of the private right of action in light of the interface, at
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least four different results can be suggested:

(1) The basis

for a private damage action for violation of Regulation T has
been undermined and canceled out by the amendment of section
7 of the 193 4 Act and the promulgation of Regulation X thereunder for the reason that in the past under Regulation T the
broker shouldered the entire responsibility for compliance with
the margin requirements, but Regulation X now puts the responsibility equally upon the investor.

(2) The private right of

action survives in the face of the promulgation of Regulation
X; however, Regulation X provides an in. pari delicto or equal
fault defense in an action by an investor that the court or
jury can manipulate in making a determination as to the degree
of culpability of each party.

(3)

The private right of action

survives in the face of the promulgation of Regulation X, unless
the investor has wilfully and intentionally tried to evade the
15/
provisions of the margin requirements.
(4) The private right
of action survives in the face of the promulgation of Regulation
X and a broker can expose himself to almost strict liability for
a violation of Regulation T for the reason that someone should
be saddled with the responsibility of assuring compliance with
the margin requirements and the broker is in the best posture
to do this.

The in. pari delicto defense would be denied under

this approach for the reason that private suits serve an important enforcement function and this enforcement purpose would disallow an in pari delicto defense in the securities area as it
16/
has been disallowed in the antitrust area.
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The court is of the opinion that, as -outlined in the
first alternative, the promulgation of Regulation X has
removed the necessary legal underpinning for implying a private right of action for a violation of the margin requirements, and that Regulation X cancels out the private right of
action implied under Regulation T.

As a matter of law, there-

fore, Count V in the complaints which alleges a violation of
Regulation T should be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.

Further, however, the court

is of the opinion that motions for summary judgment would have
to be granted in favor of defendants for other reasons under
the facts of these cases.
Most private actions under Regulation T have been brought
in tort on the rationale that where a defendant's violation of
a prohibitory statute has caused injury to the plaintiff, the
latter has a right of action if one of the purposes of the enactment is to protect interests similar to those of the plaintiffs.

The implication of a private right of action under

Regulation T was based upon an enactment and a regulation promulgated thereunder, neither of which had as their purpose the
protection of the investor.

To find a basis on which to predi-

cate liability under Regulation T, a secondary effect of shielding the investor from spreading his resources too thinly has

11/

been recognized.

In light of the amendment to section 7 of

the 1934 Act by Congress and the promulgation of Regulation X
thereunder, it appears tenuous to continue to elevate what the
report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce

_ i -*_

w
characterized as a "by-product11 effect

into a "purpose" of

the enactment and then to imply from this implied purpose a
private right of action for an investor, who now, like the
lender,violates the law by carrying securities with the credit
obtained in a transaction involving a Regulation T violation.
In 19 70 when Congress considered and amended the margin provisions in section 7 of the 1934 Act, a private remedy could have
been provided at that time.

Instead, however, Congress dealt

only with countering secret foreign financing in circumvention
of the margin regulations.

Commenting on the policy implica-

tions of Regulation X, the court in S.E.C. v. Packer, Wilbur &
Co., Inc., 362 F.Supp. 510, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) stated:

"The

clear import of Regulation X is that Congress was determined
not to limit the burden of compliance to brokers alone but
rather extended it to customers as well."
The court, under the circumstances, credits Congress with
adequate insight to provide enforcement of its own enactments.
When Congress, with the knowledge that for years a private right
of action had been implied by some courts under section 7 of the
1934 Act, amends the section in a manner which directly undercuts the legal basis upon which the private right of action was
grounded and fails to directly authorize a private right, it
would seem pretentious for this court to expand an area of
federal law so recently considered by Congress by "implying" a
private damage action for those guilty of margin violations
under the law.

For these reasons, the court holds that a private

right of action no longer exists under Regulation T due to the
-1

A -

amendment to section 7 of the 1934 Act which resulted in the
19/
promulgation of Regulation X.
Therefore, Counts V of
plaintiff's complaints are dismissed.
The court further observes that even if it be argued
that a private right of action should still be implied in the
face of Regulation X, the authorities do not support such an
implication on behalf of an institutional investor as in this
case.

As Judge Friendly observed in a persuasive dissent in

Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2nd Cir.
1970), cert, denied. 401 U.S. 1013 (1971):
To be- sure, it may be proper in some instances
to impose civil liability in furtherance of the
subsidiary purpose of § 7(c), protection of the
innocent "lamb" attracted to speculation by the
possibility of large profits with low capital
investment. . . . Pearlstein, an experienced
speculator, was no lamb, and the trial judge
specifically found that he was not induced to
enter into the transactions by any expectation
that defendant would be slow in selling him out
if he were to default in payment.
The University, an institutional investor (and an agency
of the sovereign) which must operate under guidelines established
by statutes, regulations and rules, engaged itself in a farflung, wide-ranging investment program in common stocks which
it now asserts it had no authority to do. Neither the main
purpose of section 7(c) —

e.g.,". . . to prevent a recurrence

of the pre-crash situation where funds which would otherwise
have been available at normal interest rates for use of local
20/
commerce, industry and agriculture. . . . "
— nor the secondary
purpose —

e.g., the " . . . protection of the small speculator
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by making it impossible for him to spread himself too thinly
21/
. . ."
— are served by implying a private right of action
under the facts of this case.

The funds that were invested

by the University would not, directly at least, *be available
to support local commerce, industry and agriculture, nor can
the University be said to be the "small speculator" concerning
whom Congress might have had secondary concern in making it
impossible to spread itself too thinly.

A threshold require-

ment of serving or forwarding the public purposes of section
7(c) of the 1934 Act must be met before a private right of
action for civil liability can be implied thereunder.

The

rationale that argues for implying a private right of action
for a financially strong institutional investor under either
the primary or secondary purpose of section 7(c) hangs from a
thin, fragmented thread.

The court is unaware of any authority

under which private civil liability should be implied or sustained in this case.
Lastly, even if a private right of action should still
be implied in the face of Regulation X and the other considerations set out above, at the very least, Regulation X would provide an in pari delicto or equal fault defense which would sustain a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants under
the facts of this case.

Regulation X makes the University

equally responsible and liable with the defendants for the
alleged margin violations.

Ignorance of the law is generally

no defense when charged with its violation; however, in this

_1 £ -

regard, the University cannot be characterized as unknowledgeable with regard to the requisites of Regulation X when
it had ready access to legal counsel and also had available
to it the experience and manpower of the office of the Utah
Attorney General, itself a law enforcement agency, charged
with advising various state agencies concerning the exercise
of their powers.

It is interesting to observe that the court

has not been advised that the University took advantage of
that portion of Regulation X which allows a purchaser to correct a non-compliance by promptly taking whatever remedial
22/
steps are necessary upon discovery of the violation.
At best,
therefore, the plaintiff's theory is novel, in that it seeks to
selectively rescind and be made whole on all its loss transactions while keeping the benefits of its gain transactions.
The court is unaware of any authority which would allow such a
favorable remedy to a plaintiff who is equally guilty of violation of the regulation under which liability would be imposed
against the defendant.

Neither justice nor reason provide

grounds on which to sustain a cause of action for the University's theory under all the circumstances of this case.
PENDENT CLAIMS BASED ON STATE LAW
In State of Utah v. duPont Walston, Inc., et al., CCH
SEC. L. REP. 1(94,812, at 96,713 (D.C. Utah, October 1, 1974),
the court was concerned with the pendent state law claims, and
the court's observations therein expressed are equally applicable again in these cases.

In United Mine Workers of America
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v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) the Supreme Court held that as
a matter of constitutional power, pendent federal jurisdiction
exists whenever state and federal claims "derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact" and are such that a plaintiff
"would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding."

Id. at 725.

The Court, however, stated further

in this regard:
That .power need not be exercised in every case in
which it is found to exist. It has consistently
been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a
doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right.
Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court
should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state
claims, even though bound to apply state law to
them, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both
as a matter of comity and to promote justice between
the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the
federal claims are dismissed before trial, even
though not insubstantial in a. jurisdictional sense,
the state claims should be dismissed as well.
Similarly, if it appears that the state issues
substantially predominate, whether in terms of
proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of
the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the
state claims may be dismissed without prejudice
and left for resolution to state tribunals. Id.
at 726-27.
(Emphasis added.)
These cases present a clear instance where state claims should
be dismissed now that the determination has been made that there
is no federal claim.
before trial.

The federal claims have been dismissed

The remaining pendent claims involve complicated

questions necessitating the construction of a morass of seemingly conflicting state statutes in order to determine the scope
of power and authority of a state institution to invest in common

stocks.

This is a classic instance when "needless decisions

of state law should be avoided . . . as a matter of comity
. . . by procuring . . . a surer-footed reading of applicable
law."

Id. at 726.
It is appropriate to observe that the court is advised

that by virtue of a state court suit brought by the University
many of the issues involved in the pendent claims are on appeal
to the Utah Supreme Court.

It should be the primary right of

the Stdte Supreme Court to construe the state statutes
involved in these pendent claims.

It would be abortive for

this court to decide questions so fundamentally fraught with
state interests when the issues are on appeal before the Utah
court.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Merrill Lynchfs

iy
motion for judgment on the pleadings

and all other defendants'

24/
motions to dismiss

on Counts I, II, III, IV and V of the com-

plaints are granted for failing to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, and plaintiff's complaints are dismissed,
along with the causes of action based thereon, and the remain25/
ing state law pendent claims are dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this 8th day of July, 1975.

/s/ ALDON J. ANDERSON
ALDON J. ANDERSON
United States District Judge
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FOOTNOTES
1. The University is the sole plaintiff in each of the actions
with the exception of the suit filed against Merrill Lynch, NC
74-46, in which case the State of Utah is also named as a party
plaintiff. A reference herein to the "University" or to the
"plaintiff" is intended to embrace both plaintiffs in NC 74-46.
2. Each case has the same variety except NC 74-43 and NC 74-45
which do not have a count based upon the alleged violation of
Regulation T, promulgated by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System under Section 7(a) and (c) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
3. The motion to dismiss of defendant Bosworth, Sullivan &
Co., Inc., was filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) only.
4.

This rule provides:
"A member, in the conduct of his business, shall
observe high standards of commercial honor and
just and equitable principles of trade."

5. This is the NASD "suitability rule" which states that: "In
recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of
any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon
the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as
to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs."
6. All defendants are contemplated except Merrill Lynch in
NC 74-46.
7. "Boiler room" or "boiler-shop" is a high pressure sales
campaign conducted by telephone. See VI L. LOSS, SECURITIES
REGULATION 3708 (Supp. 1969).
8.

12 C.F.R. §220.4 (1973).

9. The required time in the case of a purchase through a
special cash account is seven business days. 12 C.F.R. §220.4
(c)(ii)(2) (1973). However, as in this case, if payment is to
be made against the delivery of the security by the broker,
the required period may be extended to thirty-five days. 12
C.F.R. § 220.4(c) (ii) (5) (1973).
10. See Note, In pari delicto as a Defense to Violations of
Margin Legislation under the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 9 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 113, 118-19 (1974); Note,
Regulation X: A Complexis, 50 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 136 (1974).
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11. BANK RECORDS & FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS ACT OF ,1970, TITLE
III, 84 Stat. 1124, 15 U.S.C* § 78g(f)(l) (1971).
12.

12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1973).

13.

See H.R. Rep. No. 975 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970).

14.

12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1973).

15. The first paragraph of Regulation X states its purpose as
follows:
"
[T]o prevent the infusion of unregulated credit
obtained both outside and within the United States
securities markets in circumvention of the provisions of the Board's margin regulations or by
borrowers falsely certifying the purpose of a loan
or otherwise wilfully and intentionally evading
the provisions of those regulations. 12 C.F.R.
§ 224.1 (1973). (Emphasis added.)
The court reads this provision in two parts. The first part
(ending at the first conjunction "or") explains the purpose of
Regulation X in terms of preventing the infusion of unregulated
credit, the mere circumvention of the margin regulations. The
second part (following the first conjunction "or") speaks of
preventing the false certification of the purpose of a loan, and
the phrase "or otherwise wilfully and intentionally evading" is
thought to refer only to "falsely certifying the purpose of a
loan."
To conclude that an investor need not have a wilful intent to
evade the margin requirements in order to violate Regulation X
is consistent both with the obvious construction of the stated
purpose of the regulation as herein explained and with the tenor
of Regulation T and the federal securities fraud laws which do
not require wilfulness in order to show a violation.
16. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,
293 U.S. 134, 138 (1968).
17. Remars v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F.Supp. 1014, 1017
(D. Mass. 1949). See also, H.R. Rep. No. 1383, infra note 18,
in which deterring the investor from spreading himself too thinly
was seen as a "by-product" of the main purpose of the regulation.
18. The report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce stated:
The main purpose of these margin provisions . . .
is not to increase the safety of security loans
for lenders. Banks and brokers normally require
sufficient collateral to make themselves safe without the help of law. Nor is the main purpose even
protection of the small speculator by making it

impossible for him to spread himself too thinly—
although such a
will be achieved as a
by-product of the main purpose. H.R. Rep. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
19. The court is aware of the leading Regulation T decision
of the Second Circuit, Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429
F.2d 1136 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971)
which concluded that the disadvantages of giving the "unscrupulous" plaintiff a windfall recovery were outweighed by
the "salutary policing effect" a private cause of action would
have upon broker-dealers. Id. at 1141. The Pearlstein decision rejected the defense of in. pari delicto in a suit alleging violation of Regulation T. However, the reasoning employed
for that conclusion has been undermined by the subsequent enactment of Regulation X. The Pearlstein Court, as analogous authority, specifically referred to the antitrust decision of Perma
Life Mufflers v. International Parts, 392 U.S. 134 (1968), which
had rejected the _in pari delicto defense in the antitrust area.
In expanding on that analogy, the Second Circuit pointed out
that
[a]lthough Perma Life would apparently continue
to deny recovery to plaintiffs who had not been
coerced but who had benefited from the arrangement equally with the defendant, such a defense
does not appear desirable in the securities area
here involved, even when the investor may be shown
to have had knowledge of margin requirements. Unlike the antitrust laws which forbid both seller
and buyer to enter into a proscribed transaction,
the federally imposed margin requirements forbid
a broker to extend undue credit but do not forbid
customers from accepting such credit. 429 F.2d
at 1141.
The premise of that position—that buyers are not prohibited from
entering into improper margin transactions—has been overruled by
Regulation X. Thus, the primary ground of the Pearlstein argument for rejecting the iri pari delicto defense in Regulation T
cases is no longer valid. In addition, the analogy to the private policing policy of antitrust laws is weak at best, since
those statutes specifically provide for private civil actions
and encourage private enforcement actions by the treble damages
provisions. In contrast, no such Congressional imprimatur
exists for private actions under Regulation T. Thus, antitrust
cases such as Perma Life are inappropriate authority in this
case for rejecting the i.n pari delicto defense, or even for the
importance of a private right of action.
In Pearlstein Judge Friendly dissented on the grounds that the
holding would encourage customers to violate the margin rules.
429 F.2d 1148. A similar argument could be made against the :
court's holding in the instant case; that is, by abolishing a
private right of action altogether, the incentive to comply

with margin requirements is reduced for both broker-dealers
and customers andf as a consequence, "devil's bargains" might
result, depending upon the probabilities of detection through
public enforcement. The court believes, however, that the
potential for this kind of abuse is diminished by the current
disinclination of broker-dealers to jeopardize their public
image, their relationship with the SEC, and their standing
among other broker-dealers in the industry. There are a sufficient number of other enforcement avenues of the regulations
in question.
20.

H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d'Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).

21.

Id.

22.

12 C.P.R. § 224.6(a) (1973).

23. The court is aware that a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is theoretically directed towards a determination
of the substantive merits of a controversy, but that it also
has an incidental function under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (h)(2) of
permitting certain procedural defects, as in this case— a
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted—to be reaised after the close of the pleadings. 5
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil § 1369,
at 701 (1969). The court, therefore, considers defendant
Merrill Lynch1s motion for judgment on the pleadings to be
essentially in the same procedural posture as the other defendants1 motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b) (6) .
24. Although affidavits and other supporting materials have
been filed by the respective parties, the court elects to
ground its holding herein on the defendants1 original motions
to dismiss.
25. The court has noted the suggestion of plaintiff's counsel
in its brief that for the reason that this court has previously
upheld identical 10b-5 counts in the duPont complaint (NC 74-9)
and in the Merrill Lynch complaint (NC 7 4-4 6) , that amendment
to the complaint might be allowed if the court had question as
to the sufficiency of the 10b-5 counts. Plaintiff's arguments
in this regard are not well taken and they inaccurately represent this court's prior rulings. In duPont, the defendant filed
a motion to dismiss all counts in the complaint and the motion
was granted only in respect to Counts I, II and III, which
were the "suitability" counts as in the instant cases. However,
when the defendant in duPont filed its motion to dismiss as to
all counts, the complaint did not at that time contain a 10b-5
count. Plaintiff amended the complaint to include the 10b-5
count after the motion to dismiss was filed. The sufficiency
of the 10b-5 count in duPont was never briefed, argued, or considered by the court. Further, the court has never ruled on
the viability of the 10b-5 count in the Merrill Lynch complaint.

Counts I, II and III in the Merrill Lynch complaint are, as
the court has previously stated in this order, different from
their counterparts in the other complaints in that they are
bottomed on alleged violations of Rule 10b-5 as well as on
alleged violations of the stock exchange rules in question.
In this court's order of October 11, 1974, in the Merrill
Lynch case, a motion to dismiss these three counts, on the
grounds that a private right of action does not exist, was
denied. In that order the court merely held that it read the
complaint to allege a 10b-5 claim, rather than a claim based
solely on the stock exchange rules. Today the court has considered the sufficiency of those three counts and has determined that they should be dismissed, among other reasons, as
being cumulative and redundant since Count IV of the Merrill
Lynch complaint also alleges a 10b-5 violation. Supra at 7.
In view of the fact that plaintiff has chosen to stand on the
10b-5 pleading in its present form by not seeking opportunity
to amend prior to the disposition of the motions to dismiss,
and after now considering the nine complaints herein and the
extensive briefinf and argument in pretrial motions in which
the court has not been advised nor become aware of even an
oblique reference to any additional facts that might be pleaded
in order to state a claim in this regard, amendment at this
juncture appears futile. See Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962). For these reasons, the court does not construe
plaintiff's suggestion that amendment might be allowed as a
motion for leave to amend.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
NORTHERN DIVISION
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE,
a Utah body politic and
corporate,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

Plaintiff,
NC 74-38
-vsBEAR, STEARNS & CO., a corporation,
Defendant.

On October 18, 1974, plaintiff in the above-entitled
matter filed a set of interrogatories upon the defendant.

A

series of objections and responses followed, including a motion
to compel answers filed by the plaintiff on December 2, 1974.
On May 8, 1975, plaintiff's counsel notified the court by letter
that its motion to compel had not been ruled upon and requested
that discovery now be allowed in view of the pending motion for
summary judgment in this matter.

The request for discovery, while

appropriate, is mooted by the court's ruling this day in another
order that there is no cause of action stated.

Therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to compel
is denied.
DATED this 8th day of July, 1975.

/s/ Aldon J. Anderson
ALDON J. ANDERSON
United States District Judge

